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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 11-1699 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
TARIK McNISH, 
                      Appellant 
______________ 
 
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
(D.C. Crim. Action No. 05-10) 
District Judge: Honorable Thomas I. Vanaskie 
______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
October 28, 2011 
______________ 
 
Before: SLOVITER, GREENAWAY, JR., and ALDISERT, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Opinion Filed:  October 31, 2011) 
 
______________ 
 
OPINION 
______________ 
 
 
GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge. 
 
 Appellant, Tarik McNish (“McNish”), violated the conditions of his supervised 
release.  The District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania sentenced him to 
2 
 
twelve months of incarceration, followed by two years of supervised release.  McNish’s 
counsel (“Counsel”) petitions this Court for permission to withdraw from representing 
McNish on appeal, pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).  For the 
reasons set forth below, we will grant Counsel’s petition and affirm the conviction and 
sentence imposed by the District Court. 
I.  Background 
 We write primarily for the benefit of the parties and recount only the essential 
facts. 
On December 22, 2010, two months into his four-year term of supervised release, 
McNish was arrested and charged in state court with escape, criminal conspiracy, 
disorderly conduct, and possession of drug paraphernalia.  McNish pled guilty to 
possession of drug paraphernalia.  The other charges were dismissed.   
 The District Court held a revocation of supervised release hearing based on the 
conviction,
1
 as well as McNish’s failure to report to his Probation Officer at the 
appointed times and failure to notify the Probation Officer of his change of address.  At 
the revocation hearing, McNish admitted to the violations.   
At sentencing, McNish sought a term of incarceration within the advisory 
Guidelines range.  McNish presented mitigating circumstances and urged the court not to 
impose any period of supervised release.  The District Court considered the factors set 
                                                 
1
  As a condition of his supervised release, McNish was not to commit another federal, 
state, or local crime. 
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forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and sentenced McNish to twelve months of incarceration 
and two years of supervised release. 
II.  Jurisdiction 
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 3231, 3583(e).  We 
have jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
III.  Standard of Review 
 “In Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), the Supreme Court explained the 
general duties of a lawyer representing an indigent criminal defendant on appeal when 
the lawyer seeks leave to withdraw from continued representation on the grounds that 
there are no nonfrivolous issues to appeal.”  United States v. Marvin, 211 F.3d 778, 779 
(3d Cir. 2000).  Under Anders, counsel seeking to withdraw from representation must 
“satisfy the court that he or she has thoroughly scoured the record in search of appealable 
issues,” and “explain why the issues are frivolous.”  Id. at 780.  “The Court’s inquiry 
when counsel submits an Anders brief is thus twofold:  (1) whether counsel adequately 
fulfilled [Third Circuit Local Appellate Rule 109.2’s] requirements;[2] and (2) whether an 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
2
  Local Appellate Rule 109.2 provides, in pertinent part: 
 
Where, upon review of the district court record, counsel is persuaded that the 
appeal presents no issue of even arguable merit, counsel may file a motion to 
withdraw and supporting brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 
(1967), which must be served upon the appellant and the United States.  The 
United States must file a brief in response.  Appellant may also file a brief in 
response pro se. . . . If [the court] finds arguable merit to the appeal, or that the 
Anders brief is inadequate to assist the court in its review, it will appoint 
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independent review of the record presents any nonfrivolous issues.”  United States v. 
Youla, 241 F.3d 296, 300 (3d Cir. 2001).  Where frivolousness is patent, however, “we 
will not appoint new counsel even if an Anders brief is insufficient to discharge current 
counsel’s obligations to his or her client and this court.”  United States v. Coleman, 575 
F.3d 316, 321 (3d Cir. 2009). 
 A District Court’s decision to revoke supervised release is reviewed for abuse of 
discretion.  See United States v. Maloney, 513 F.3d 350, 354 (3d Cir. 2008).  Factual 
findings are reviewed for clear error, and legal issues are reviewed de novo. See id. 
IV.  Analysis 
 Counsel has satisfied his obligation to thoroughly search the record for any 
appealable issues, and has identified all potentially appealable issues, none of which is 
nonfrivolous.  Only three issues could potentially form the basis of an appeal: (1) the 
District Court did not have jurisdiction to revoke the term of supervised release being 
served by McNish; (2) the District Court was required to find by a preponderance of the 
evidence that McNish violated the conditions of supervised release, which was not 
proven, see 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e); and (3) the District Court committed an abuse of 
discretion by not giving meaningful consideration to the factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 
3553(a).  McNish did not file a brief.  The Government agrees with defense counsel that 
no nonfrivolous issues exist on appeal. 
                                                                                                                                                             
substitute counsel, order supplemental briefing and restore the case to the 
calendar. 
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 The District Court had jurisdiction, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3583, which grants 
jurisdiction to the District Court over the imposition and revocation of McNish’s 
supervised release.  The underlying conviction and the violations of the conditions of 
supervised release all occurred in the Middle District of Pennsylvania.  Appeal of the 
District Court’s decision on this basis would be frivolous.   
 The second argument, that insufficient evidence existed to demonstrate the 
violation occurred, is also without merit.  District courts have the authority to revoke a 
term of supervised release if they “find[] by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
defendant violated a condition of supervised release.”  18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3).  We have 
emphasized that in order “to revoke probation it is not necessary that the probationer be 
adjudged guilty of a crime, but only that the court be reasonably satisfied that he has 
violated one of the conditions.”  United States v. Poellnitz, 372 F.3d 562, 566 (3d Cir. 
2004) (citing United States v. Manuszak, 532 F.2d 311, 317 (3d Cir. 1976)) (internal 
quotations omitted).  McNish pled to the state court charge and admitted to the technical 
violations of his conditions of supervised release.  Sufficient evidence existed to support 
the District Court’s decision to revoke the supervised release. 
 The third issue to address is whether the District Court gave sufficient weight to 
the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).  This issue also lacks merit.  At the 
revocation hearing, McNish raised several arguments seeking mitigation of his sentence.  
The District Court considered the arguments, and concluded that the negative factors, 
such as the short period of time McNish had been on supervision before the crime 
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occurred, and McNish’s criminal history, particularly regarding drug related offenses, 
warranted the sentence the District Court imposed.  Further, the transcript of the 
sentencing hearing amply demonstrates the District Court’s meaningful consideration of 
the 18 U.C.S. § 3553(a) factors.  There is no basis for appeal on this issue.  
V.  Conclusion 
 We find that no nonfrivolous issues exist for consideration on appeal.  We will 
grant Counsel’s motion to withdraw, pursuant to Anders, and affirm the judgment and 
conviction of the District Court.  Counsel is also relieved of any obligation to file a 
petition for writ of certiorari in the Supreme Court.  See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 109.2(b) (2011). 
